Redesigning the governance of employment policies- Decentralised centralisation in Danish municipal jobcentres by Larsen, Flemming & Bredgaard, Thomas
   
 
Aalborg Universitet
Redesigning the governance of employment policies- Decentralised centralisation
in Danish municipal jobcentres
Larsen, Flemming; Bredgaard, Thomas
Publication date:
2008
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Larsen, F., & Bredgaard, T. (2008). Redesigning the governance of employment policies- Decentralised
centralisation in Danish municipal jobcentres. Paper presented at CARMA's 25th anniversary conference,
October 10 2008, Aalborg University Denmark, Workshop 4 "Changing labour markets - changing governance of
employment policies", Aalborg, Denmark.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: May 01, 2017
 1 
CARMA’s 25
th
 anniversary conference 
October 10 2008, Aalborg University Denmark 
Workshop 4 “Changing labour markets – changing governance of employment policies” 
 
 
Redesigning the governance of employment policies  
- Decentralised centralisation in municipal jobcentres  
 
Thomas Bredgaard (thomas@epa.aau.dk) &  
Flemming Larsen (flemlar@epa.aau.dk),  
Centre for Labour Market Research at Aalborg University (CARMA), Denmark 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
What mode of governance and implementation structure does it take to implement work-first 
policies? This relationship between what we label operational and formal policy reform is relatively 
novel in the field of research on employment policies. The primary ambition of this paper is to give 
some insights into an answer by reviewing recent Danish experiences with reforms of the content 
and governance of employment policies.  
 
Danish experiences are not unique, since a number of countries are currently undertaking major 
reforms of the governance and implementation of employment policies. The most important  
operational reforms include the creation of single gateways (one-stop shops), the introduction of 
new public management techniques and instruments, the contracting out of public employment 
services and the decentralisation of service delivery to sub-national authorities. Although such 
reforms are often put forward by decision-makers as “technical” and “a-political” (cf. Brodkin 
2006: 4), we argue that they have often fundamental and wide-ranging implications for service 
delivery agencies, front-line workers and the unemployed.  
 
The article proceeds by examining the analytical relationship between formal and operational policy 
reform within the field of employment policies. Subsequently, we review the relationship in a 
specific case (Danish employment policy) in order to understand the rationales behind, the 
dynamics within and the implications of the relationship between formal and operational policy 
reform.    
 
2. Formal and operational policy reforms in employment policies 
 
Although the distinction between formal and operational policy draws on the well-known 
distinction between policy and administration, it is not identical.1  
 
                                                 
1 In traditional application, policy refers to the policymaking process; deciding policy alternatives and setting policy 
objectives, while administration refers to the neutral execution of these policy objectives by a loyal cadre of civil 
servants. Although implementation theories studies the “missing link” between policy and administration (Hargrove 
1975) and tend to abandon the clear distinction between policy and administration, it still tend to focus more on the 
implementation of policy objectives and policy problems than operational changes in service delivery mechanisms and 
implementation structure. 
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Formal policy reforms, like the introduction or changes of the substance of active labour market 
policies, activation programs and workfare policies, have been studied extensively (Lødemel & 
Trickey 2001; Peck 2001; Goul Andersen et. al 2003). Until recently, researchers tended to focus on 
substantial changes in policy design and content (programs, instruments, and services). As active 
labour market and workfare policies were widely disseminated by the OECD and the EU in the 
1990s (OECD 1994; European Commission 1993), researchers responded by studying the 
rationales, processes, implications and classifications of new instruments, schemes and programs 
(cf. Jessop 1993; Lødemel & Trickey 2001; Peck 2001; Torfing 1999, 2004; Larsen et. al 2001, 
Bredgaard et. al 2003; Barbier 2004). The knowledge about what types of governance and 
implementation structures it takes to change from passive to active labour market policies was more 
scattered and unsystematic (Considine 2001; Berkel forthcoming).  
 
During and especially after the (intentional) transformation from passive to active labour market 
policies in a number of OECD-countries, wide-ranging reform of operational policies have been 
introduced in the same countries. As Berkel and Borghi states: “It is no exaggeration to state that a 
‘wave’ of welfare reforms aimed a substantive changes in social policies has been followed by a 
second reform wave aimed at reorganising the institutional structures through which service 
provision take place” (Berkel & Borghi 2008: 333). Despite country variations, the stated objectives 
of these operational policy reforms are often similar: To create a more cost-efficient, effective, 
costumer-oriented and un-bureaucratic service delivery and implementation structure.  
 
The governance mechanisms for achieving these objectives often comprise the creation of unified 
and simplified implementation units (e.g. jobcentres, one-stop-shops, single gateways), the 
contracting out of the public employment services (quasi-markets), the decentralisation of 
operational responsibilities to sub-national entities (e.g. regions, local governments, non-profit 
sector), and the strengthening of new public management instruments and techniques in the running 
of government (e.g. contract management, performance measurement, benchmarking, management 
by objectives, quality management). That is, the introduction of new ways of “doing policy” as a 
process of reforming the institutional arena of management, organisation, implementation and 
delivery of programs and services. This wave of operational policy reform is now evident in a 
number of OECD-countries, for instance Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, France, 
Belgium, the U.K., Australia, and the USA (cf. Thuy et. al 2001; Bredgaard & Larsen 2007, 2006; 
Sol & Westerweld 2006; Considine 2001).  
 
Operational policy reforms go far beyond employment and social policies, and involve the public 
sector in its entirety. At the societal level, the reforms reshape relations between various state 
institutions, between the state and the market, between the state and the civil society, and between 
citizens and the market (Clarke & Newman 1997; Daly 2003). At the operational level, which we 
will focus on in the following, the reforms refer to new ways of steering and running public 
institutions (see table below).  
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Table 1: Formal and operational policy reforms in employment policy 
 Formal policy Operational policy 
Definition The content (substance) of legislation, 
programs, schemes and instruments for 
delivering benefits and providing 
services 
The governing of the implementation 
structure for administration of benefits 
and provision of services  
Indicators  Changes in entitlements, rights and 
responsibilities, target groups, 
instrument, programs and schemes 
Changes in inter-agency cooperation, 
decentralisation, purchaser-provider 
split, new public management 
techniques and instruments, introduction 
of new or reorganisation of old 
organisations  
Dominant research 
tradition 
Labour market and social policy 
research 
Governance and new public 
management research, implementation 
studies 
Sources: Daly 2003; Berkel & Borghi 2008, Berkel forthcoming. 
 
Traditionally, labour market policy reforms of formal policy and operational policy have been 
studied in relatively isolation from each other (cf. Berkel & Borghi 2007, 2008). Social policy and 
labour market researchers have mainly focussed on studying and evaluating changes in substantial 
policy (like programs, instruments, and service delivery), while public management and public 
governance researchers have studied the steering and implementation structure (organisation and 
management).  
 
The increasing interdependence between ways of “doing policy” and “policy delivery” makes this 
academic division of responsibilities and research interests problematic (Daly 2003). As Berkel 
argues: “Operational policy reforms not only have consequences for formal policy reforms, the 
reverse is true as well: formal policy reforms create a need for operational policy reforms” (Berkel 
forthcoming). In our case, this implies that the intention to shift the content of employment policies 
towards work first requires new implementation structures, and that these new structures also 
impacts on the content of policies (cf. the Danish case below). 
 
Being more recent in adoption, the body of literature on the rationales, dynamics and implications 
of operational policy reforms is smaller than that of formal policy reforms (for a literature review, 
see Berkel & Borghi 2008). In the field of employment policy, there are, nonetheless, a number of 
single-case country studies and a small but growing literature on the comparative dimensions of the 
reforms and their impacts upon clients, public services and agencies involved in this sector (cf. 
Considine 2001; Bruttel 2004; Struyven & Steurs 2005; Sol & Westerweld 2005; Bredgaard & 
Larsen 2005, 2006, 2007; Berkel & Borghi 2007). In this article we review another single-case 
(employment policy reforms in Denmark). By doing so we illustrate some of the more general 
questions related to the linkages between formal and operational policy reform, and attempt to draw 
lessons from the Danish case. 
 
Similarly, Rik van Berkel has studied the relationship between formal and operational policy reform 
during the transformation from passive to active welfare states in labour market and social policies 
(Berkel & Borghi 2008, Berkel forthcoming). In this article, we attempt to move one step further by 
exploring the relationship during the introduction of a sub-species of active labour market policies, 
namely work-first policies. Equally important questions – which we will not pay attention to in this 
 4 
article – concerns the outcomes in relation to the users of services and in terms of the effects on the 
functioning of the labour market and the democratic accountability of new governance structures. In 
international comparisons – which are not possible either in this paper – important questions about 
convergence and divergence in governance reforms emerge, also evoking questions about policy 
transfer and learning.  
 
3. New governance and implementation mechanisms in Danish employment policy 
 
The concept of governance is difficult to define and used in a variety of ways in the booming 
literature (cf. Daly 2003). At its most simplistic, governance is the anti-thesis of government; the 
hierarchical, bureaucratic state apparatus. Governance then includes “new” arenas and levels of 
government above, beyond and below the nation-state. In the literature new modes of governance 
like networks, collaboration and partnerships are familiar examples (cf. Rhodes 1997; Pierre 2000; 
Kooiman 1993, 2003).  
 
We do not, however, adhere to the de-contextualised and universalising notion of a general shift 
from government to governance, but insist like Newman (2001, 2007) that the transformation of 
welfare states involves “reordering of a number of different regimes of power that are overlaid on 
each other in complex ways, producing tensions, ambivalences and points of disjuncture” (Newman 
2007: 368). Operational policy reforms create new tensions and contradictions between the different 
modes of governance, and empirical realities are seldom located neatly in ideal-typical categories, 
but rather in different hybrids and mixes. We, therefore, aim at studying the concrete “governance 
mix” emerging from operational policy reforms in employment policies.  
 
In the Danish case of employment policy reform the most important reforms of the administration 
and implementation of policy delivery are the integration of service delivery through new local 
jobcentres, and the contractualisation of the public employment service.2 These reforms are 
intersected by a new central-local relationship creating new tensions and balances between 
(re)centralisation and decentralisation. We begin the case presentation by identifying the formal 
policy transformation towards a work first approach, and then analyse how it is related to and 
impacts upon operational policy reforms. 
 
3.1. Changing policy content towards work-first 
 
In international comparisons, Danish labour market regulation is quite unique. Even if the welfare 
state follows the Scandinavian traditions of universal services and benefit provision and the public 
sector is large in international comparison, the labour market has traditionally been characterised by 
limited state intervention (Larsen 2002; Bredgaard et. al 2005, 2006). The labour market is liberal in 
the sense that the state does not, in principle, intervene in the voluntary collective bargaining of 
labour market organisations (trade unions and employers associations) and job protection for 
ordinary employees is weak (Madsen 1999; Jørgensen 2002). This has created a special relationship 
between a flexible labour market with high job-to-job mobility and a relatively generous social 
security system – often labelled Danish “flexicurity” (Madsen 1999, 2003).  
 
                                                 
2 Since the implications of the contracting out of the public employment services in Denmark have been reviewed in a 
number of articles (Bredgaard & Larsen 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005; Bredgaard 2008), we mainly focus on the creation of 
local jobcentres in this article. 
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Since the early 1990s, active labour market and educational policies for the unemployed have 
grown in importance as the third corner in a “golden triangle” (Madsen 1999; Bredgaard et. al 
2005a). Active labour market policies have two basic functions: to motivate the unemployed to take 
and seek vacant jobs (a deterrence effect), and to help the unemployed that are not capable of 
finding a job on their own (a qualification effect). Danish policy-makers have increasingly 
prioritised the motivation effect above the qualification effect, implying that employment policies 
have gradually shifted from a human capital to a work-first approach (cf. below). This is evident 
from the successive legislations on employment policies during the late 1990s and the beginning of 
the new century.  
 
Despite the gradual convergence of formal policy towards activation in both labour market and 
social policies, the mode of governance remained separated in a two-tier benefit system and a two-
tier implementation system. Active labour market policy was mainly reserved for unemployed 
persons with unemployment insurance entitlements, while social policy was reserved for uninsured 
persons on various types of social assistance (social benefits, disability benefits, rehabilitation etc.). 
While labour market policy was run by the central government is close consultation with the social 
partners (trade unions and employers association), social policy was mainly the responsibility of 
local governments (Damgaard 2003). 
 
As a new liberal-conservative government took office in 2001 fundamental changes of the 
governance and implementation structure followed. The first move was to rename labour market 
policy to employment policy under the formal responsibility of the Minster of Employment. In 
2002, the labour market reform “More people into employment” (Flere i Arbejde) followed up on 
recent years reforms moving towards a more profound work-first approach. The new government 
intended to “close down the activation industry” (especially the purportedly inefficient municipal 
activation projects and expensive education and training schemes). Rather than supposedly “long-
term, inefficient, and expensive” activation programs the objective was to (re)integrate the 
unemployed as quickly as possible on the open labour market. This also included “making work 
pay” policies by reducing the economic disincentives of specific groups like immigrants and 
refugees and stricter sanctions and availability criteria. But also changes of the governance structure 
were on the agenda. Hence, the reform created a split between purchasers and providers by 
contracting out services for insured unemployed, and an intention was formulated to construct a 
new “one-stringed” employment system by integrating the national PES and municipal employment 
services.  
 
Although several reforms before has changed the balance, this reform is often said to be one of the 
main pillars in a shift in active labour market policies away from a human-capital approach towards 
a work-first approach. Although the objective is the same; economic self-sufficiency through labour 
market integration, the two approaches are fundamentally different (cf. table 2).  
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Table 2: Approaches to formal policy reform 
  
Active labour market policy 
 
 
Passive labour market policy 
 
Approach 
 
 
Work first 
 
Human Capital 
 
Social security 
Strategy Disciplining Integration Security 
What is the main 
problem?  
Lack of economic 
incentives and 
motivation 
Lack of competences 
and qualifications 
 
Lack of jobs and lack of basic 
income  
Where is the 
problem? 
The supply side  The supply side  The demand side  
What is the solution? Stimulating economic 
incentives to “make 
work pay”  
Enhancing 
competencies and 
qualifications 
Decent level of income 
support  
  
Motivation of target 
group 
Extrinsic Intrinsic None 
Entitlements for 
income maintenance 
Conditional upon duty 
to work or participate 
in activation programs  
Conditional upon 
improvement of work 
capacity 
Unconditional and universal 
benefits 
 
Program goal   Job as quickly as 
possible 
Improve work and  
earning capacity 
Improve quality of life 
 
End goal Self-sufficiency through labour market 
integration 
Social security and equity 
 
 
3.2. The construction and substance of new local jobcentres  
 
What kind of mode of governance and implementation structure does it take to implement this 
work-first approach in employment policy? Seen from a designers perspective, the local 
municipalities was one of the major obstacles, as several studies had shown major differences 
between the several reforms intentions of introducing work-first elements and the actual 
implementation (Larsen et. al 2001). Hence, the most important organisational reform was the 
invention of new local jobcentres in each municipality.  
 
The original intention of the government was to create an entirely municipal implementation 
structure, which in effect implied a full transfer of responsibilities from the public employment 
service to local governments, including a unified benefit system.3 It, however, quickly ran into 
strong opposition, mainly from the social democratic party and the labour market organisations 
(trade unions and employers association) that preferred the state PES system in which they 
traditionally had significant influence over labour market policy formulation, steering and 
implementation.  
 
A window of opportunity, however, opened when the government decided to make a local 
government reform (abolishing the regional level of counties, and transferring authority to both the 
central government and new, larger local governments). In 2004, the government made its 
                                                 
3 The amalgamation of the unemployment insurance benefits and social assistance system would in effect also remove 
benefit administration from the unemployment insurance funds. 
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intentions on operational policy reform explicit by proposing to establish jobcentres in each 
municipality, where the focus should be the quickest possible return to the labour market. 
Jobcentres were to be organised as independent municipal agencies only responsible for job 
(re)integration, while benefit administration should remain a responsibility of either the local 
governments (uninsured unemployed) or unemployment insurance funds (insured unemployed). 
Thus, the government was attempting to unify employment services, but not benefit administration 
and financing systems (Danish Government 2004). 
 
After political negotiations on local government reform in the spring of 2004, the government 
concluded an agreement with Dansk Folkeparti (the populist, anti-immigration party that has 
secured a parliamentary majority for the government since 2001). Although the social democratic 
party is not supporting the governance reform, the political agreement is formulated in accordance 
with the concessions given to the Social democrats during the negotiations, and the final agreement 
is far from the clean municipal cut that the government has announced only two months earlier. The 
preference for a municipal employment system is only tested out in about 10 pilot-centres out of 91 
jobcentres, and will be evaluated by the central labour market administration before 2010. It will 
then be up to the government to consider whether these pilot-centres should be rolled out in every 
municipality. The political process, thus, resulted in a hybrid jobcentre system.  
 
Figure 1: Organisational set-up of the Danish employment system 
 
 
There are two different types of jobcentres. In the majority of municipalities (77) the PES and the 
municipal social and employment departments are working side-by-side in the same building. The 
PES remains responsible for services and benefits for insured unemployed, and the municipalities 
remains responsible for uninsured unemployed – which also means that there are two different 
executives: one from the PES and one from the municipality (quite similar to the German 
Arbeitsgemeinschaften, ARGE). The remaining 14 jobcentres are run exclusively by local 
Minister of Employment
Administrative region Employment region
BER
RBR
Jobcentres
Municipality
State LBR
Central government financing
Monitoring results and effects
KB
Municipal financing
Municipality
BER: Central employment council
RBR: Regional employment council
LBR: Local employment council
KB: Municipal government  
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authorities on a trial-basis. In both types of jobcentres, an organisational split between employment 
services and benefit administration has been created. Jobcentres are responsible for job 
(re)integration services; this include visitation, profiling, job-matching, counselling and advice, 
contact session every 3 months, referrals to wage subsidy schemes, enterprise apprenticeships, 
education and training, and other activation schemes. Jobcentres are not responsible for benefit 
administration (benefit payments and sanctions), which is done by either the local government 
administration or the unemployment insurance funds. Social interventions (like therapy, treatment 
for various types of abuse) are not the responsibility of jobcentres either, and remain the 
responsibility of social departments of the municipalities. In the implementation of employment 
policies, the jobcentres may use external service providers contracted by either the central 
government administration, the regional employment authorities or tendered by the jobcentre itself 
(Bredgaard & Larsen 2008; Bredgaard 2008). Currently about 10 % of unemployed are referred to 
external service providers (private companies, educational institutions, trade unions and 
unemployment insurance funds etc.), but this percentage is clearly expected to rise in coming years, 
as the governance reform settles in.                                                                                                              
 
The main official intention behind the jobcentre reform is to ensure equal treatment of target groups 
irrespective of whether they are insured or uninsured unemployed, and to create a better coordinated 
and integrated employment services. Another important – although more implicit – objective is to 
gain strategic control over municipal employment policies to push implementation towards work-
first (cf. below).      
 
3.3. Implementation of employment policies in local jobcentres 
 
As mentioned above previous studies show that the implementation of employment policies in the 
municipalities was more in line with a human capital and social integration approach and not the 
legislative intention of work-first (Larsen et al. 2001). This implementation “deficit” could be 
explained by the combination of a high level of local autonomy and a different problem perception 
of the implementing agents, and thereby the methods and instruments to be used. Implementing 
agents found that a majority of the target group had so severe problems beside unemployment that 
the work first approach was futile. Despite a number of work first measures (requiring participation 
in activation programs in return for benefits, stronger availability requirements, job-seeking 
activities, and tougher sanctions), the municipalities only implemented this for a minor group of 
“strong” and (often) young unemployed, while the remaining was treated according to principles in 
a social integration approach or just kept in passivity. Another important finding was the large and 
often inexplicable variations among municipalities (Larsen et. al 2001; Bredgaard et. al 2003).  
 
So despite repeated formal policy changes aimed towards work-first, the municipalities in general 
implemented a different and more lenient approach. This was also mirrored in the way the 
municipalities organized the employment services in “traditional organizations” with a strong focus 
on input, norms of the case-worker profession, use of generalists and high discretion for the front-
line workers. This organisation of employment services in municipalities, therefore, also made it 
difficult to change policy implementation towards work-first.  
 
These findings, among other things, gradually led to a growing conviction among dominant policy-
makers and especially the central bureaucrats of the labour market administration that the traditional 
governance and implementation structure was not capable of implementing work-first policies.  
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In the process leading up to the political agreement on new local jobcentres, the minister of 
employment was especially outspoken in his criticism of the front-line workers implementing 
municipal activation policies. They were accused of protecting the unemployed from labour market 
reintegration by focussing on barriers, social interventions, and childhood-problems of the clients 
rather than finding the quickest possible route back to the labour market (cf. Stigaard et. al 2006: 
10). The gap between the work-first policies of the government and the lenient implementation by 
local municipalities had to be reduced. At a speech to the administrative executives of the social 
departments in the municipalities in 2003, the Minister of Employment made it clear that: “…the 
employment system must be designed so that we are certain that the rules of the Parliament are 
complied with […] No Minister can live with the fact that [s]he is held accountable for something 
that [s]he has no influence on. We need consistence between central and local priorities” (own 
translation, Speech by Claus Hjort Frederiksen, Minister of Employment, Annual meeting of Social 
Service Directors, 27.10.2003, www.bm.dk).  
 
Likewise, the leading civil servants in the central labour market administration have increasingly 
recognised these implementation gaps. As the executive head of the Ministry of Employment (Bo 
Smith) and another leading civil servants (Helle Osmer Clausen) describes it: “There is often a long 
way from political agreements on labour market reforms to the practical implementation at the 
operating levels – i.e. front-line workers in the PES and municipalities, unemployment insurance 
funds or “other actors […] On a number of occasions, implementation seems like an ‘black box’. 
They go on and focus especially on the implementation gap between central and local government: 
“The incentive mechanisms in the municipal part of employment policies are balancing diverse 
considerations, among other things because of local self-governance and municipal priorities. 
There is a need to do more research on how the intentions from general reforms are ‘translated’ 
and run through the systems – from the central political level, through local management in the 
municipalities, and then to the employment and social agencies, and, in the end, the front-line 
workers” (Clausen & Smith 2007, p. 75, 91).  
 
From the position of central bureaucrats in the labour market administration, the jobcentre reform 
presented “one of the most significant institutional challenges of employment policy in modern 
times (Clausen & Smith 2007: 82). We should not be blind to the self-interest of the central 
bureaucracy, however. The jobcentre reform provided an opportunity to expand the turf and 
responsibility of the ministry of employment and central administration. Especially the integration 
of the PES and municipalities in new local jobcentres implied two opportunities: To escape 
operational responsibilities in the running of the PES-system, and to gain strategic control over the 
implementation of municipal employment policies. Thus, the new public management dictum of 
“steering not rowing” informed the vision of the central bureaucrats, and was introduced through 
new performance benchmarks, output and outcome measurement, benchmarking and incentive 
mechanisms. The local government reform opened a “window of opportunity” for introducing what 
was perceived as a new mode of governance in employment policy, and could be labelled 
centralised decentralisation: on the one hand gaining a stronger strategic control over the autonomy 
of local governments and front-line workers, and, on the other hand, shielding the Minster of 
Employment (and central civil servants) from a notoriously unpopular policy-area by delegation of 
operational responsibilities to the new local jobcentres (Bredgaard & Larsen 2007). 
 
The interesting question is now: Have the designers succeeded? Can operational reforms be used as 
the main driver for formal reforms? In spring 2008 we carried out a representative internet-based 
survey on the implementation of active employment policies in the municipalities (response rate 59 
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%). The respondents were the municipal executives in the new jobcentres. The main objective was 
to identify the implications of the new modes of governance in municipal employment policy on the 
implementation of policies, specifically whether the local jobcentres were transforming the content 
of policies towards work first. This should make us capable of giving some answers to the question 
of success or failure for the designers. Furthermore, the new survey made it possible to evaluate 
changes over time by comparing with the similar survey from 2001 (Larsen et. al 2001; Bredgaard 
et. al 2003),  
 
It is clear from the new survey that the substance of employment policies has changed towards 
work-first. In 2001, the most important objectives in municipal implementation towards persons on 
social security were to take individual consideration and use activation to re-qualify the 
unemployed by training. In 2008, it has (according to the municipal executives) changed to place 
demands on the individual and use sanctions in case of non-compliance, and to use activation as a 
work-test. (cf. table 3 below) In general all indicators of work-first or disciplining 
(demands/sanctions, work-test and compliance with labour need for manpower) are now considered 
more important objectives, while all indicators of human capital or integration (upgrading of 
skills/training, individual consideration and improvement of life quality) are considered less 
important compared to 2001 (cf. table 3). 
 
Table 3: The municipal executives prioritisation of objectives for employment services in 2001 and 
2008. 
Given the fact, that employment services often call for different soulutions from case to case, how 
important do you in general consider these objective for your services? (Prioritise from 1-6 in this 
way: Indicate the most important with 1, the second most important with 2, etc.)  
 Average 2008 
(n=50) 
Average 2001 
(n=176) 
To place demands on the individual and use sanctions in case of 
non-compliance 
2.8 3.1 
To use activation as a work-test (availability test) 3.0 3.5 
To comply with the needs of the labour market for manpower 3.2 4.7 
To use activation for upgrading of skills, with weighting of 
training/education 
3.3 2.8 
To take individual consideration to comply with the wishes and 
intrinsic motivation of the unemployed 
3.7 2.6 
To improve quality of life for the individual 5.0 4.3 
 
The clear majority of municipal jobcentre executives prioritise that persons on social assistance as 
quickly as possible find work rather than improving their employability in the longer run. The 
majority of respondents are also prioritising the needs of the labour market for manpower higher 
than individual requirements and needs of persons on social assistance (cf. table 4) 
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Table 4: How does the Jobcentre prioritise the employment policy purposes? Please assess what 
statement (A or B) that best match the way the jobcentre carry out the tasks (n=57) 
A 
Agree 
with A 
 Neutral  
Agree 
with B 
B 
The Jobcentre prioritise that 
persons on social assistance 
as quickly as possible find 
work 
51 % 26 % 18 % 4 % 2 % 
The Jobcentre prioritise that 
persons on social assistance 
improve their employability 
in the longer run 
The Jobcentre prioritise the 
needs of the labour market 
for manpower 
25 % 26 % 28 % 16 % 5 % 
The Jobcentre prioritise the  
individual requirements and 
needs of persons on social 
assistance 
 
Compared to 2001 the municipal perception of the problems to solve in the employment service has 
also changed. In 2001, the municipal executives replied that the main reason for unemployed not 
being in activation was that they had so severe problems, that efforts were pointless for this group. 
They also assessed that 2/3 of the group had problems beside unemployment, and were not ready 
for work. In 2008, the municipal executive for the jobcentres replied that the main reason for 
unemployed not being in activation is high administrative workload. They still assess that 2/3 of the 
unemployed are not ready for work, but knowing that unemployment has fallen for persons on 
social assistance between 2001 and 2008 and assuming that the most employable have found work, 
this is certainly also indicating a new problem perception in the municipalities. Hence, a higher 
number of unemployed are assessed as ready for work. In this connection it is also remarkable, that 
the huge variations between the municipalities in the assessments of the unemployed has been 
significant reduced between 2001 and 2008. 
 
The designers of formal policy reform, therefore, seem to have succeeded.  Perceptions and 
strategies of the municipalities have changed. A more profound work-first approach is now being 
implemented. But what role do operational reforms play for this “success” seen from a top-down 
perspective? Our study gives some indicators of how operational reforms are related to the 
implementation of work-first. 
 
One of the most important aspects in this respect is without doubt, the new steering concept applied 
on the jobcentres. Rhetorically, the local jobcentres have operational responsibility over the 
implementation of employment policy, but the central government and administration has 
strengthened monitoring, benchmarking, output and outcome measurement. A new governance 
system with a new mode of decentralised centralisation has been introduced. The Minister of 
employment set a number of performance goals. In 2008 this included goals like:  Unemployed with 
more than 3 months unemployment have to be reduced, 25% of the unemployed, that have been 
“passive” for minimum 1 year must be in job or education, the same group must in average be self-
sufficient 15% of the time, the same group must in average be in activation 40% of the time they are 
unemployed and the jobcentre must secure that the number of young unemployed (under 30 years) 
is reduced compared to the year before. The local government is then (in cooperation with the local 
employment council) allowed to include additional local goals. These performance goals are all 
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written down in a local employment plan (Beskæftigelsesplan). The local jobcentres are regularly 
under supervision and a special yearly audit is made (resultatrevision). If the jobcentre does not 
perform as expected, the minister can (after reports from the local or regional employment council 
or the regional employment authorities) ultimately contract out the services to private providers. But 
not only this goal setting system and the threat of sanctions gives the municipality incentives to 
perform as expected, also a new monitoring system put the jobcentres under pressure to deliver 
specific performances and results. This system goes beyond the stated goals, and measure a wide 
range of different activities and effects of the jobcentres. It is furthermore open for the public and 
designed to benchmark jobcentres with similar conditions (naming and shaming). This system is 
perhaps even more effective than the ministerial performance goal system in changing behaviour, 
especially in order to make the jobcentres pursue short term employment effects (cf. table 4). The 
same effect has been found when employment services are contracted out to external service 
providers, since payments are measured by short term employment effects (Bredgaard and Larsen 
2006, 2008).   
  
Another important way not only to discipline the unemployed but also the actors involved in the 
implementation of employment services, is the profiling system and the standardization of methods 
and instruments. Parallel with the new governance system a prescribed profiling system has been 
introduced (visitationsværktøjskassen), involving that the unemployed is categorized into five 
groups. The municipal executives assess that this not only leads to higher standardization of 
visitation and methods in the new employment system, but also that the offers given have become 
more standardized (cf. table 5 and 6).  
 
Table 5. Standardization of measures in the new employment service system  
 
Have there been changes in services for unemployed after the formation of local jobcentres in the following 
areas? The offers made have become…. 
 Procent 
Much more standardized 7,5% 
More standardized 39,6% 
The same as before 49,1% 
Less standardized 0,0% 
Much lesser standardized  3,8% 
Don’t know 0,0% 
Total 100,0% 
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Table 6: Standardization of visitation and methods in the new employment service system 
 
Have there been changes in services for unemployed after the formation of local jobcentres in 
the following areas?  - Visitation (profiling) and methods have become …(n=54). 
 Percent 
Much more standardized 9,4% 
More standardized 71,7% 
The same as before 15,1% 
Less standardized 3,8% 
Much lesser standardized  0,0% 
Don’t know 0,0% 
Total 100,0% 
 
The majority of respondents in the municipalities, therefore, find that services, profiling and 
methods have become more standardised. This is indicating that varied approaches towards “wicked 
problems” are translated into more uniform approaches towards “tame” problems (Rothstein 1998), 
corresponding to the work-first approach. 
 
The third important factor inherent in the operational reforms in Denmark that might explain why 
policy changes towards work-first can be observed in the municipalities is the organizational 
distinction between the jobcentre and the benefit- and social policy department in the municipality. 
The jobcentre is only allowed to work with the single problem of getting people into jobs. The 
majority of respondents agree that the organizational distinction has led to a stronger job-orientation 
in implementation, slightly more for persons that are assessed to be readily employable.  
 
Table 7: How do you asses the following statement: The organisational division between jobcentre 
and benefit administration has generally led to a more job-oriented implementation? 
 Persons on social assistance 
assessed to be ready for the 
labour market 
Persons on social assistance 
assessed to be unready for the 
labour market 
Fully agree 49 % 24 % 
Partially agree 18 % 28 % 
Neither agree nor disagree 24 % 26 % 
Partially disagree 10 % 14 % 
Fully disagree 0 % 10 % 
Do not know 0 % 0 % 
Total (n) 100 % (51) 100 % (51) 
 
The same organisational division has at the same time made it more difficult to implement a holistic 
approach (63 % of the respondents fully or partially agree on this statement.). 
 
In general the described operational policy reform seems relatively successful in changing 
perceptions, strategies and implementation of municipalities towards the work first approach.  
 
There are, however, still a number of challenges. One major challenge is the implementation 
problems that have emerged in relation to a much more bureaucratic organization. Especially the 
very high demand for documentation makes it very difficult to carry out the main task of giving 
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service for unemployed. As indicated above the municipal executives reply that the main reason for 
unemployed not being in activation is high administrative workload. An estimate of how much time 
the front-line worker use on administration illustrates the problem very well (cf. table 8) 
 
Table 8: How much of the total work hours for front-line workers are used on administrative 
tasks (reporting, documentation, etc.)?  
 Procent 
76-100% 78% 
51-75% 74% 
26-50% 9% 
0-25% 8% 
Do not know 2% 
Total 100% 
 
The executives estimate that over 80% of the front-line workers spend 50% or more time on 
administration. Similarly, time studies carried out by Local Government Denmark (the national 
association of municipalities) show that 45 minutes of every hour is spend on administration for the 
front-line workers (www.kl.dk).    
 
Another expected implementation barrier for the new operational reforms was the local politicians. 
They used to be resistant to central initiatives reducing local autonomy. Our study, however, quite 
surprisingly indicates that local politicians pay slightly more attention to the performance and 
fulfilment of the goals set in the employment plan (beskæftigelsesplan) than the concrete services 
given to the unemployed. And furthermore they seem to make only few efforts to set up their on 
agenda or priorities on the municipal employment services. One explanation might be that the 
system is in a transitional phase, where the system is going to be evaluated in 2010 in order to 
decide the future structure, probably on the basis of the performance in the new steering concept. So 
fulfilment of centrally set goals becomes important. But it might also by explained by the fact that it 
is easier to relate to fixed goals than concrete services.    
 
Even if the organisation designers have succeeded in driving policy towards more work first 
through the new system of governance, some of the municipal executives still remains quite critical 
to the operational reforms. In our survey there are clearly two types of respondents, i.e. two types of 
municipal jobcentre executives: While about one half of the respondents are positive of the new 
modes of governance and implementation regime, the remaining is clearly sceptical. So there is still 
an “implementation barrier” among some of the jobcentre executives. This resistance to work first 
policies is also clear among front-line workers, although recent research have shown that they are 
implementing the central policy objectives to a greater extent that they used to do (Beer et. al 2008). 
A further challenge is to make the fusion between the PES and municipalities work in the majority 
of jobcentres. Despite intentions of a better coordinated and integrated employment service 
irrespective of benefit entitlement, the two systems are still functionally separated within the 
jobcentres (cf. Eskelinen 2008). Despite the fact that functional specialisation and organisational 
divisions seems to persist within the new jobcentres, it is also clear that the municipalities has the 
upper hand. The majority of our respondents (56 %) assess that the running of the jobcentres is 
today most inspired by the (prior) municipal way of organising and implementing the field rather 
than the way the state PES system used to do it (17 %) (the remaining 28 % do not know). This is 
only further emphasising the feeling that the joint jobcentres between the PES and municipalities 
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are not viable in the long run, and that the hybrid jobcentre system is only a midway stop towards a 
fully municipalised system. 
 
To sum up, the operational reform seems to have been effective in changing the implemented 
employment services towards work-first in the Danish municipalities. Operational reforms have 
probably made this possible. But as shown new implementation problems emerge, and there are still 
challenges ahead for this apparently success of using a new governance mode to change the 
substance of the implemented employment service.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this article we have focussed empirically on one element of the relationship between operational 
and formal policy reform; the implementation of work-first policies in municipal jobcentres. The 
state PES system has been embedded as the “baby brother” in this new hybrid employment system. 
External service providers are also used as implementing agents, and the new tendering regime is 
further pushing the substance of employment policies towards work-first.  
 
In comparing the implementation of municipal employment policies in 2001 and 2008, we found 
clear indications that the substance of employment policy has changed towards work-first. We 
found that this transformation is not only related to formal changes of legislation, but also important 
changes of the mode of governance and implementation structure in employment policy. The most 
important operational changes to ensure this policy shift towards work-first seem to be: 
 
- The decentralised centralisation including a new central performance goal system and 
strengthened monitoring, benchmarking, output and outcome measurement giving a stronger 
focus on short term employment effects 
- A standardized profiling system leading to more standardized services 
- An organizational split between the jobcentre and the benefit- and social policy departments 
in the municipalities 
 
There are a number of new challenges emerging from this new governance system: 
 
- A much more bureaucratic organisation with high administrative workload has emerged. 
The front line workers spend more time on administration than they do on contacts with the 
unemployed. 
- The new governance structure is probably only a midway stop towards something yet 
undecided. This gives the municipalities (and the local politicians) incentives to be positive 
co-players in the new steering concept in order to paw the way for a full municipalisation of 
employment services 
- Resistance against the new steering concept can be observed among a substantial part of the 
municipal executives and among front-line workers. 
- The fusion between PES and the municipalities in the jobcentres does not seem to have 
succeeded so far.   
 
In this case of Danish employment policy the relationship between formal and operational policy 
appears to be dialectical: The success of formal policy reforms towards work-first have depended 
on the introduction of operational policy reform, which again seems to have an independent effect 
on formal policy. In employment policy, Danish policy- and decision makers have increasingly 
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realised that the implementation process is an important precondition of the success of formal 
policy changes, and have had a relative success in changing these implementation structures. 
Although such changes of operational policy are clouded in technical language of improved 
efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and service-orientation, they are clearly political in nature.  
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